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ABSTRACT 
 
Transaction value analysis (TVA) integrates the concepts of resource heterogeneity and 
transaction cost economics into a single framework, which emphasizes both value 
creation and value claiming in firms vertical integration decisions. Using a TVA 
perspective, we develop hypotheses to explain the firms intent to outsource application 
services. A sample of 178 firms in the publishing and printing industry in The 
Netherlands is used to test the hypotheses. This paper finds that firms take both value-
creation and value-claiming motivations into consideration, with value creation having 
on average a dominating impact, thus substantiating the TVA framework. However, we 
also find that if the risks of opportunism in outsourcing contracting are high, value 
creation becomes the less important factor in make-or-buy decisions. Furthermore, the 
paper shows that the need for flexibility is a major driver of governance choice for 
value-creation as well as for value-claiming motivations. Implications and future 
research directions are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Value creation and value claiming are two components of the firms interorganizational 
strategy. However, interorganizational strategy models tend to have a one-sided focus 
on one of the two. For example, transaction cost theory is criticized for having a single-
minded focus on the risks of opportunism of contracting partners and neglecting the role 
of value creation in governance decisions (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Ghosh and John, 1999; 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). On the other hand, Porter (1996) 
warns that the single-minded focus on creating value in practices such as outsourcing 
and benchmarking is also an insufficient basis for strategic analysis if the firm cannot 
also claim its share of the value. 
 Thus, value creation and value claiming should be given equal attention in 
interorganizational strategy models. Based on this view, a strategy model emerged for 
analysing interorganizational relationships called transaction value analysis (TVA), the 
aim of which is to analyse processes by which exchange partners create and claim value 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993). According to this theorem, resources and attributes of 
exchange interact to determine success in creating and claiming value. Differently put, 
governance decisions should take into account the value of unique resources provided 
by other firms as well as the risks of opportunism of contracting relationships. Although 
the TVA framework emphasizes the importance of joint value creation in 
interorganizational relationships, it is not inconsistent with transaction cost theory 
(Zajac and Olsen, 1993: 133). It merely extends the transaction cost analysis by 
including the impact of value creation on the firms governance decision making. 
 The goal of this paper is to apply the TVA framework to strategic outsourcing 
decisions, a phenomenon that according to various authors will rise substantially during 
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the coming decade (e.g., Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002). We especially seek to 
uncover the decision calculus of strategic outsourcing decisions. In our empirical 
application, the TVA framework will be used to explain the decision to outsource 
application services of firms in the publishing and printing industry in The Netherlands. 
 According to the Application Service Provision Industry Consortium (2001), an 
application service provider (ASP) manages and delivers application capabilities to 
multiple entities from a data centre across a wide area network. Application services 
include application hosting, network management, and technical support. The 
development of standard communication protocols has spurred the interest in 
outsourcing application services (Hagel and Brown, 2001). These standards have 
created an open network environment in which firms can outsource application services 
and leverage application services in which they have a distinctive capability (Amit and 
Zott, 2001; Quinn, 2000). Thus, outsourcing application services seems to provide 
many opportunities to exchange valuable resources and capabilities between firms, and 
therefore opportunities for joint value creation. 
 Yet, the current growth of the ASP market is not meeting the high expectations that 
were proffered. For example, Dearden (1987) argued that in-house information systems 
would cease to exist because of the superior efficiency and technology of external 
providers. However, in general, application services are highly firm specific, and 
therefore outsourcing these services may put the firm at risk. For instance, ASPs may 
not be able or willing to meet the outsourcing firms future demands (e.g., Earl, 1996; 
Barthelemy, 2001). In this paper, we argue that both joint-value-creation and value-
claiming processes may play a substantial role, and therefore the TVA framework is the 
appropriate framework to analyse the firms decision to outsource application services. 
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 The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly explain the TVA framework, and 
then we develop refutable implications for the application service outsourcing decision. 
Subsequently, we discuss the method and data collection and present the results. We 
find that value-creation and value-claiming motivations simultaneously play a role in 
application service outsourcing decisions, with value-creation variables having on 
average a dominating impact, thus substantiating TVA. However, we also find that if 
the risks of opportunism in outsourcing contracting are high, value creation becomes the 
less important factor in make-or-buy decisions. The final section of the paper discusses 
the implications of the findings and provides outlines for future research on 
interorganizational strategies. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Transaction value analysis extends traditional transaction cost analysis by embedding 
value creation in the firms governance decisions. When managers make outsourcing 
decisions, we presuppose that they implicitly engage in value creation as well as value 
claiming. Differently put, there will be some aspects of outsourcing decisions that are in 
accordance with transaction cost theory because they reflect value claiming but other 
aspects that reflect value creation, where theories such as resource-based theory will 
play a role. 
 Why would TVA be relevant for the decision to outsource application services? By 
forming outsourcing relationships, firms definitively seek to create value. For example, 
outsourcing provides opportunities to exchange valuable resources and capabilities 
between firms (Quinn, 2000). However, firms also have a value-claiming motivation, a 
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motivation that is stressed by transaction cost theory. For example, firms might be 
motivated to accomplish value claiming and value creation at the same time. In general, 
we expect that the starting point of any outsourcing decision is the presence of value-
creating opportunities; however, the decision will be corrected to a great extent by the 
risks of opportunism that outsourcing contracting might provide. 
 In the following subsection, we discuss outsourcing of application services as a 
source of value creation, and then we shift our attention to the value-claiming processes 
that may play a role. 
Outsourcing application services as value creation 
According to the resource-based view of the firm (Penrose, 1959), firms seek to attain 
(and at times control) idiosyncratic or costly-to-copy resources and capabilities, as such 
resources expand the scope of the value-creating activities under consideration. Firms 
rarely create value in isolation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1997), and therefore, in 
order to compete successfully, firms may often need the resources of different firms 
(Barney, 1999). Other studies define value creation as the sum of all values that can be 
appropriated by the individual participants (e.g., Amit and Zott, 2001; Brandenburger 
and Stuart, 1996). However, in our analysis, joint value creation is distinguished from 
value appropriation by individual firms as these are considered different components of 
the interorganizational relationship. Based on the literature (e.g., Ang and Straub, 2002; 
Kern and Willcocks, 2000; Quinn, 2000; Smith, 2002) and in-depth interviews with IT 
managers, we conceive that production efficiency, application technology, and network 
technology are possible sources of joint value enhancement of outsourcing application 
services compared with in-house service provision. 
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 Neoclassical economic analysis would justify outsourcing to firms that have a 
comparative cost advantage in production of goods or services. According to Ricardo 
(1817), firms can gain a comparative cost advantage by means of specialization and 
exchange. Specialization leads to scale economies, which may lower production costs; 
however, as Williamson (1975: 1619) pointed out, in the absence of the risks of 
opportunism these economies cannot independently affect make-or-buy decisions since 
they are similarly available to buyers and suppliers. According to the resource-based 
view, the source of comparative cost advantage arises from the development of firm-
specific capabilities rather than from scale economies (Argyres, 1996). Outsourcing 
allows firms to focus their resources on core activities, thereby increasing firm-specific 
experience and skills, which in turn may lead to an increase of production efficiency 
that is difficult to immitate by competitors. So, the perceived production efficiency 
advantage of application service provision might be an important driver of outsourcing 
application services. 
 However, according to the Penrosean view of value creation, survival of the firm in 
the long run depends not on the efficiency of production, but rather on the ability of the 
firm to establish a base from which it can adapt and extend its operations in an 
uncertain, changing world (Penrose, 1959). Penrose (1960) illustrates this with respect 
to technology in a case study of Hercules Powder Company. Its extensive technology 
base leveraged a strategy of moving into developing markets that, in turn, led the firm 
to invest further in the advance of technology. Putting it in terms of the more recent 
dynamic capabilities literature, unpredictable contingencies require flexible capabilities 
that permit rapid response, and such capabilities require a broad and deep knowledge 
base (e.g., technological, market, product) in order to devise appropriate responses 
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(Volberda, 1998: 108). ASPs provide access to a broad range of specialized and 
advanced application and network technology, by making sophisticated application and 
network technology available to enterprises that could not afford such a broad and deep 
knowledge base otherwise (Quinn, 2000; Smith, 2002), thereby supporting a dynamic 
and flexible response capability in information technology for the outsourcing firm. 
 Summarizing, we expect that the resources and competencies of ASPs may increase 
production efficiency but besides may provide access to a broad range of application 
and network technology, which the outsourcing firm may use to develop a dynamic and 
flexible response capability in information technology. The perception of these 
advantages by the outsourcing firm will increase the firms intention to outsource 
application services. We present the following hypotheses concerning value creation: 
Hypothesis 1a: The perceived production efficiency advantage of application service 
outsourcing is positively related to the firm’s intent to outsource application services. 
Hypothesis 1b: Given the perceived production efficiency advantage, the perceived 
application technology advantage of application service outsourcing is positively 
related to the firm’s intent to outsource application services. 
Hypothesis 1c: Given the perceived production efficiency advantage, the perceived 
network technology advantage of application service outsourcing is positively related to 
the firm’s intent to outsource application services. 
 
 
8
Outsourcing application services as value claiming 
Firms, according to transaction cost analysis, will choose a governance mechanism that 
will govern their transactions effectively at the lowest possible cost (Coase, 1937). 
Williamson (1985, 1996) argued that the transaction costs resulting from the risks of 
opportunism are the major component of transaction costs and hence the major 
determinant of governance choice. In our analysis of value-claiming motivations, we 
only refer to the transaction costs resulting from the risks of opportunism, as other 
comparative advantages in transaction efficiency are not related to the value-claiming 
processes in interorganizational relationships. 
 Transaction costs resulting from the risks of opportunism have particular importance 
in situations where firms make asset-specific investments, i.e., investments that are to 
some extent specific to a particular exchange. Specific assets in application outsourcing 
include dedicated equipment, operating procedures and software, skills, and know-how 
tailored for the use of a specific organization (Ang and Straub, 2002). Because 
contractual agreements can never be complete, asset specificity causes dependence 
between the exchange partners, and this contractual uncertainty makes the outsourcing 
firm vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviour of exchange partners. Safeguarding 
against such behaviour would result in significant transaction costs. Thus, a higher level 
of asset specificity of application services will be negatively related to the firms intent 
to outsource application services. 
Hypothesis 2a: Asset specificity is negatively related to the firm’s intent to outsource 
application services. 
 
 
9
 The level of market and technological uncertainty facing a firm may also affect the 
level of transaction cost associated with alternative modes of governance (Williamson, 
1996), and this uncertainty is likely to vary depending on the environment in which the 
firm operates. However, research drawing on transaction cost theory has produced a 
conflicting set of results with respect to the relationship between market and 
technological uncertainty and governance mode (e.g., Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). One 
explanation of the conflicting results may be that firms face different levels of an 
exchange that influence the comparative adaptation efficiency of a governance mode. 
For example, market uncertainty is likely to be associated with greater fluctuations in 
demand, which might lead to recontracting of the exchange with external providers for 
market governance or renegotiating staffing levels of internal services for hierarchical 
governance. Renegotiating at both levels may lead to considerable transaction costs, 
where the first type of transaction costs will reduce the comparative efficiency of 
market forms of governance and the second type will reduce the comparative efficiency 
of hierarchical forms of governance. Thus, the final effect of market uncertainty may be 
the comparative magnitude of these transaction costs. 
 The question, therefore, is what will determine the outcome. Masten and Crocker 
(1985) argue that in the case of long-term contracts, efficient adaptation of contractual 
provisions to changing demand critically depends on the ability of the supplier to 
deliver the product or service to alternative buyers. The open network environment in 
which application services are delivered makes it relatively easy for the provider to 
deliver application services to other buyers. Hence, supply of application services by 
ASPs can be adjusted to the required levels within a service level agreement without 
excessively increasing transaction costs, while, on the other hand, transaction costs 
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associated with adjusting internal staffing levels can be substantial (Abraham and 
Taylor, 1996). Thus, the comparative magnitude of transaction costs is likely to favour a 
market form of governance, which leads us to hypothesize that market uncertainty 
reduces the relative transaction costs of ASPs compared with in-house application 
service provision. 
Hypothesis 2b: Market uncertainty is positively related to the firm’s intent to outsource 
application services. 
 Information technology in general and application technology in particular are 
characterized by frequent technological changes, which may create a high level of 
technological uncertainty. Initially, transaction cost theorists argued that technological 
uncertainty triggers the need to update contracts continually and hence increases the 
comparative transaction costs of market exchange as a result of frequent contract 
renegotiations (Williamson, 1985). However, rapid technological change also increases 
the likelihood that investment in technology, knowledge, and routine will be rendered 
obsolete, which will increase the adaptation efficiency of market forms of governance 
(Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt, 1986; Hagedoorn, 1993; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). 
Furthermore, markets have an advantage in responding flexibly to technological 
changes, while within firms strong market signals about the value of various IT 
investments may be less likely to reach critical decision makers (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993). As was the case for market uncertainty, the final effect of 
technological uncertainty will be determined by the comparative magnitude of these 
effects. 
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 Williamson (1991) suggests that the required level of coordination makes the crucial 
difference here. If extensive coordination is required, then the advantages of hierarchy 
will prevail; however, if coordination of technological adaptations does not need to be 
extensive, outsourcing would be preferred. ASPs provide their services from a central 
location and are thus more likely to avoid complex coordination problems, which may 
reduce the transaction costs of adaptation to technological changes. Furthermore, rapid 
changes in application technology, such as updates of software applications, are the rule 
rather than the exception and can therefore be foreseen, and contractual provisions can 
be made about how to deal with them, thereby avoiding excessive renegotiating costs. 
Thus, we propose that technological uncertainty reduces the relative transaction costs of 
application service outsourcing compared with in-house application services. 
Hypothesis 2c: Technological uncertainty is positively related to a firm’s intent to 
outsource application services. 
 Flexibility of a governance mechanism is an important consideration, according to 
transaction cost theory, as incomplete long-term contracting will fail to anticipate 
and/or make correct provision for future contingencies (Williamson, 1999: 1100). 
Transaction costs associated with economic exchange include ex-ante and ex-post costs, 
where ex-post transaction costs include the opportunity cost of not shifting to more 
profitable activities in the light of new information (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). For 
example, Earl (1996) shows how unforeseen changes in business strategy can have a 
significant impact on the requirements of application services, and consequently it may 
be difficult to adjust service level agreements with providers accordingly. Furthermore, 
when a firm seeks to outsource application services, it can never be absolutely sure that 
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the providers skills will stay current or superior in meeting the firms future needs 
(Barthelemy, 2001). If the costs of switching to an alternative supplier are high, firms 
will incur high transaction costs in changing exchange partners, thus reducing their 
strategic flexibility. Thus, we hypothesize that the presence of high switching costs will 
reduce the strategic flexibility of outsourcing firms and will therefore reduce the firms 
intent to outsource application services. 
Hypothesis 2d: Switching costs are negatively related to the firm’s intent to outsource 
application services. 
The moderating effect of value claiming on value creation 
Some facets of interorganizational strategic decisions will reflect an interaction of value 
creation (production efficiency) and value claiming (transaction cost efficiency). 
However, researchers have tended to graft transaction costs onto production costs, 
which is clearly not sufficient (Madhok, 2002: 540). The outsourcing firms capability 
to claim the value enhancement resulting from production efficiency gains might 
depend on transaction cost (value-claiming) variables. For example, firms facing a high 
level of asset specificity or switching costs will find it harder to claim their part of the 
value creation resulting from production efficiency, thereby inducing a negative 
moderating effect on the firms intent to outsource application services. On the other 
hand, the risks of the costs of staffing adjustments (market uncertainty) and the risks of 
technological obsolescence are allocated to the service provider, which will make it 
more difficult for the ASP to claim its share, thereby inducing a positive moderating 
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effect on the firms intent to outsource application services. This leads us to formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: There will be a stronger, positive relationship between perceived 
production efficiency advantage and the firm’s intent to outsource application services 
when asset specificity is low. 
Hypothesis 3b: There will be a stronger, positive relationship between perceived 
production efficiency advantage and the firm’s intent to outsource application services 
when market uncertainty is high. 
Hypothesis 3c: There will be a stronger, positive relationship between perceived 
production efficiency advantage and the firm’s intent to outsource application services 
when technological uncertainty is high. 
Hypothesis 3d: There will be a stronger, positive relationship between perceived 
production efficiency advantage and the firm’s intent to outsource application services 
when switching costs are low. 
 In Figure 1, we summarize the relationships hypothesized in this section. We also 
include in our study a number of control variables. Firms with experience in 
outsourcing in other business functions are more likely to have the competencies to deal 
with the complexity of outsourcing and therefore might have a higher intent to 
outsource application services. Hence, we control for the firms overall level of 
outsourcing. Furthermore, we include the strategic importance of IT activities as a 
control variable, as activities that are considered of strategic importance are less likely 
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to be outsourced. Finally, we include as control variables the scale-related variables 
firm size and IT department size and the industry sector (publishing or printing). 
*** Place Figure 1 about here *** 
METHOD 
We choose to study the publishing and printing industry in our empirical application 
because application services do play an important role in the value-creation process for 
these firms. In order to design the questionnaire, we used scales from previous studies 
(e.g., Klaas, McClendon, and Gainey, 1999; Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Steensma and 
Corley, 2001) and in-depth interviews with IT managers working in the industry. 
Subsequently, an initial questionnaire was designed and pre-tested with eight IT 
managers in the publishing and printing industry. 
 The data were gathered using a mail survey. A random sample of 917 firms active in 
the publishing and printing industry were contacted based on a database of all firms 
registered by the Chambers of Commerce in The Netherlands. We sent out 917 
questionnaires, and a reminder was sent five weeks later. In total, 178 questionnaires 
were returned (19.4% response rate) and used for the study. The response was tested for 
representativeness with respect to size and industry characteristics and a comparison did 
not indicate significant differences. The procedure suggested by Armstrong and 
Overton (1977) was used pertaining to the firms intent to outsource application 
services. No significant differences were found on this key variable between early and 
late respondents. 
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 The scale items were first factor analysed, using principal component procedures 
and varimax rotation. Next, the psychometric properties of the scales were investigated. 
By means of an exploratory factor analysis, we analysed the different dimensions of the 
scales to assess their unidimensionality and factor structure. Items that did not satisfy 
the following criteria were deleted: (1) items should have communality higher than 0.3; 
(2) dominant loadings should be greater than 0.5; (3) cross-loadings should be lower 
than 0.3; and (4) the scree plot criterion should be satisfied (Briggs and Cheek, 1988). 
These rules are often applied to factor analyses in order to refine scales (DeVellis, 
1991). This resulted in a pool of 34 questions, which are listed in Table 1. Next, the 
reliabilities of the dimensions of each scale were assessed by means of the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient (as shown in Table 1). Following Nunnally (1978), it is desirable that 
measures of each dimension achieve an alpha greater than or equal to 0.7. In fact, as 
shown in Table 1, the alphas vary between 0.69 and 0.91. Furthermore, Table 1 shows 
that all items have correlations of 0.75 or more with their respective constructs, which 
suggests a satisfactory item reliability (Hulland, 1999).  
*** Place Table 1 about here *** 
 We used confirmatory factor analysis with EQS version 5 and maximum likelihood 
estimation to validate the scales resulting from the exploratory factor analysis. A 
satisfactory fit was achieved (χ2 = 728, df = 466, p < .01), root-mean-square estimated 
residual [RMSEA] = .05, comparative fit index [CFI] = .93. The ratio of chi-square to 
degrees of freedom is 1.56; a value of less than 3.0 for the ratio indicates a good fit 
(Carmines and McIver, 1981). A CFI value above 0.9 is considered an indication of 
good fit, and the RMSEA of 0.05 indicates good model fit because it does not exceed 
 
 
16
the critical value of 0.08 (Bentler and Bonet, 1981). The chi-square statistic was still 
significant, which is indicative of a poor fit. However, it is well documented that the 
chi-square is highly dependent on sample size (e.g., Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). Thus, 
following Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we considered the measurement model 
acceptable, given the other supportive indices.  
 Discriminant validity of the scales was further verified by comparing the shared 
variance between any two constructs and the variance extracted from each of the 
constructs. In all cases, the shared variance between two constructs was less than the 
variance extracted from each of the constructs, supporting the validity of the 
measurement model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), and none of the confidence intervals 
of the correlation coefficients between any two constructs contained 1.0 (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). 
RESULTS 
All variables (as shown in Table 2) were placed in a multiple regression using SPSS 
that resulted in an estimated model that is significant, with a p-value below 0.001. The 
coefficient of determination, R2, suggests that the unrestricted regression model can 
explain 59% of the variation around the average of the dependent variable. The 
parameter estimates support the proposed hypotheses at a 5% significance level. 
*** Place Table 2 about here *** 
 Correlations and descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3. The 
GoldfeldQuandt test was used to identify possible heteroscedasticity, and variance 
inflation factors and matrix decomposition were used to detect multicollinearity. The 
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results (F = 1.04; VIF < 2; condition numbers < 20) did not indicate any problem, and 
plots of the error term of the regression model suggest a normal distribution. 
*** Place Table 3 about here *** 
 First, Table 2 suggests that, consistent with hypothesis 1a, the production efficiency 
advantage as perceived by IT managers is positively related to their intent to outsource 
application services. The standardized coefficient is 0.26 (p < .01) for production 
efficiency. Furthermore, the results suggest that, given the production efficiency 
advantage, the application and network technology advantages are positively related to 
the firms intent to outsource application services. The standardized coefficients are 
0.26 (p < .01) for application technology and 0.20 (p < .01) for network technology, 
thereby substantiating hypotheses 1b and 1c. In confirming hypothesis 1, our results 
suggest that ASPs may indeed provide substantial distinct resources and capabilities 
that, according to IT managers, expand the scope of the value-creation processes of 
their firm, where the need to have access to a broad technology base is at least as 
important as the static comparative production efficiency of outsourcing application 
services. 
 Second, Table 2 suggests that, consistent with hypothesis 2 (a, b, c, and d), value-
claiming motivations play a significant role in outsourcing decisions. Hypothesis 2a is 
substantiated, the standardized coefficient being 0.16 (p < .01), indicating that the 
costs of safeguarding against opportunistic behaviour of the ASP may significantly 
reduce the firms intent to outsource application services. Furthermore, hypotheses 2b 
and 2c  that market and technological uncertainty are positively related to the firms 
intent to outsource application services  are both substantiated. Both standardized 
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coefficients are 0.16 (p < .01). These results suggest that the comparative magnitude of 
transaction costs resulting from market and technological uncertainty favour the market 
governance mechanism of application service provision rather than in-house service 
provision. Finally, hypothesis 2d is substantiated, the standardized coefficient being  
0.18 (p < .01), suggesting that switching costs reduce the strategic flexibility of the 
firm and thereby the firms intent to outsource application services. 
 Finally, we used hierarchical regression analysis to examine the hypothesized 
interaction effects. The statistic measuring the change in R-square (∆R2) between the 
restricted and full models is significant at a 1% significance level for the set of 
interaction terms. The standardized coefficients are 0.15 (p < .01), 0.17 (p < .01), 0.14 
(p < .01), and 0.10 (p < .05). The results support hypothesis 3 (a, b, c, and d), that the 
relation between the perceived production efficiency advantage and the firms 
outsourcing intent is moderated by value-claiming variables, where asset specificity and 
switching costs reduce the firms capability to claim value and market and technological 
uncertainty increase it. Although the size of the standardized coefficients of the main 
effects in the model indicate, as suggested by TVA (Zajac and Olsen, 1993: 133), that 
value-creation variables have a dominating impact on the firms outsourcing intent, the 
coefficients of the interactions suggest that if the risks of opportunism in outsourcing 
relationships are high, value creation becomes a less important factor in strategic 
outsourcing decisions. 
 With respect to the control variables, IT department size, industry sector, and 
general outsourcing do have significant effects on the firms intent to outsource 
application services: the standardized coefficients are respectively 0.14 (p < .05), 0.12 
(p < .05), and 0.09 (p < .10). However, neither IT strategic importance nor the size of 
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the firm has a significant effect on the firms intent to outsource application services: 
the standardized coefficients are respectively 0.04  and 0.03. 
 The results concerning the scale variables and general outsourcing may seem 
surprising. Outsourcing application services has been proposed as the method by which 
small and medium-sized firms could gain access to applications that, formerly, only 
large firms could afford (e.g., Smith, 2002). Furthermore, outsourcing of a business 
function that incorporates resources and capabilities that are of strategic value to the 
firm is generally considered to be bad practice (Dierickx, Guettler, and Heinzl, 1989: 
1505); thus, one would also expect a negative relationship between strategic importance 
and outsourcing intent. 
 However, small firms, and more particularly firms with a small IT department, face 
the difficult problem that they represent only a small part of an ASPs business and 
hence have little control in dealing with an ASP, which may explain their relatively low 
outsourcing intent. With respect to strategic importance, indeed, a firm is likely to use 
internal competence as long as it generates the same capabilities; however, if deficits in 
resources and capabilities are diagnosed, as might be the case for application services, 
outsourcing may become the more attractive option (Grant, 1991; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, 
and Winter, 1994; Teng, Cheon, and Grover, 1995). Thus, both the scale effects and the 
role of strategic importance in outsourcing seem to be interesting topics for further 
research. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study, we set out to understand better how value-creation and value-claiming 
motivations influence the firms application outsourcing decision. The TVA framework 
proved a valuable instrument for analysing facilitating and inhibiting factors in strategic 
outsourcing relationships. The results presented in this paper support the TVA view that 
in strategic governance decisions value-creation and value-claiming motivations are 
simultaneously being considered and also the view that these variables interact. 
Furthermore, as suggested by the TVA framework, the results indicate that value-
creation motivations on average dominate value-claiming concerns in the decision to 
outsource application services. Joint value creation is a principal driver of transaction 
value and may even require the use of governance structures that are less efficient from 
a transaction cost perspective (Zajac and Olsen, 1993); however, the results of this 
study also show that the impact of value creation is moderated by value-claiming 
variables. If the risks of opportunism in outsourcing relationships are high, value 
creation becomes a less important factor in outsourcing decisions. Not addressing 
transaction cost concerns adequately may even preclude outsourcing relationships, even 
where the potential for joint value creation is clearly present. 
 Our study also indicates that flexibility is a crucial driver of governance choice in 
value-creation as well as in value-claiming motivations. Access to a broad technology 
and knowledge base that allows firms to develop dynamic and flexible response 
capabilities is at least as important as the static production efficiency advantage. ASPs 
not only provide a cost advantage but more importantly provide the technology and 
knowledge base to sustain that advantage. Within value-claiming motivations, 
efficiency in adapting to unexpected future contingencies (market uncertainty, 
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technological uncertainty, and switching costs) has a dominating impact on governance 
choice. To be sure, this finding supports Williamsons counterargument (1999: 1101) 
that dynamic, not static, complications are central to transaction cost reasoning, as 
governance structures are predominantly instruments of adaptation to future 
contingencies. 
 While more research is needed in order to elaborate and validate the implications of 
TVA, the results of our study suggest that management of governance structures can 
benefit from a good understanding of the interdependence between value-creation and 
value-claiming variables in interorganizational strategies. According to TVA, 
governance decisions are, in essence, ambidextrous (Tushman and OReilly, 1996): that 
is, managers need to manage the incongruous processes of joint value creation and self-
interested value claiming in order to increase their probability of success. As we are 
moving towards a networked economy in which firms seek to focus on core 
competencies (e.g., Hagel and Brown, 2001), the search for more valued resources 
might become more intense, making joint value creation a key driver of competitive 
advantage, as well as the capability to manage the value-claiming processes associated 
with it. 
 The results presented in this paper have to be seen in the light of the limitations of 
this study. First, our sample is relatively small and refers only to the publishing and 
printing industry in The Netherlands. Future research should validate the results in a 
variety of institutional settings. Second, subsequent work could investigate the 
interdependence between value creation and value claiming in a larger model, including 
actual governance behaviour and performance. Third, the results only reflect the views 
of IT managers, which may be biased since outsourcing application services might 
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reduce the prestige of IT managers within their company. Finally, the ASP industry is 
relatively new and hence most IT managers do not have extensive experience with a 
service provider, which may have influenced the results of our study. For example, 
more experienced buyers are more aware of switching costs and are more confident that 
these switching costs are relevant (Verhoef, Franses, and Hoekstra, 2002: 206). Thus, 
future research could investigate the impact of the firms learning process during 
outsourcing relationships. 
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Figure 1. Value creating and value claiming in outsourcing application services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value-creating variables 
Production efficiency (H1a) 
Application technology (H1b) 
Network technology (H1c) 
 
 
Outsourcing intent for 
application services 
Interactions 
H3a,b,c,d 
Value-claiming variables 
Asset specificity (H2a) 
Market uncertainty (H2b) 
Technological uncertainty (H2c) 
Switching costs (H2d) 
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Table 1. Items, Constructs, and Measurement Model 
Constructs Item 
correlation 
with total 
score 
Factor 
loadings 
Outsourcing intent (alpha = 0.91)   
We intend to use ASP in our firm 0.89 0.81 
We will introduce ASP to our colleagues so that it can be used for the 
management of our IT infrastructure 
0.90 0.78 
When we buy new applications, we consider ASP as an alternative 0.90 0.80 
We will explicitly pay attention to the possibilities that ASP provides for the 
management of our IT-infrastructure 
0.86 0.74 
 
Application technology (alpha = 0.90) 
  
ASP allows my company to use new applications 0.84 0.80 
ASP will stimulate new ideas concerning the applications in my firm 0.84 0.84 
ASP allows applications that thus far were not available for my firm 0.75 0.68 
ASP allows us to make big leaps forward in using the new application 
technologies 
0.80 0.65 
ASP allows my firm to keep track of new applications 0.86 0.73 
ASP allows my firm to introduce new applications in my firm 0.85 0.76 
 
Network technology (alpha = 0.79) 
  
ASP makes it easier to safeguard our information systems 0.82 0.76 
ASP will make our servers more applicable 0.88 0.72 
ASP allows greater access to our applications 0.82 0.66 
 
Production efficiency (alpha = 0.80) 
  
ASP allows my firm to focus on core activities 0.80 0.64 
ASP lowers the costs of the IT infrastructure 0.77 0.55 
ASP provides more certainty concerning costs of application services 0.80 0.70 
 
Switching costs (alpha = 0.78) 
  
When the contract with an application service provider is terminated, we can 
easily transfer to another provider 
0.85 0.78 
When the contract with an application service provider is terminated, we can 
easily manage the IT infrastructure ourselves 
0.84 0.78 
Once my firm is using application services, it is difficult to get rid of them 
(reverse score) 
0.80 0.83 
 
Asset specificity (alpha = 0.71) 
  
My company has modified its applications to the specific needs of its employees 0.78 0.79 
My company has an IT infrastructure that is uniquely tailored to the firm 0.85 0.85 
My company needs a lot of time before employees are trained so that they can use 
the new applications 
0.75 0.67 
 
Market uncertainty (alpha = 0.69) 
  
My company is capable of predicting the demands of our products and services 0.88 0.83 
My company is capable of predicting its financial performance for the next year 0.87 0.83 
 
Technological uncertainty (alpha = 0.70) 
  
It is difficult to predict the pace of developments in information technology 0.88 0.86 
It is difficult to keep up with the developments in information technology 0.87 0.72 
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General outsourcing (alpha = 0.85)   
My company engages frequently in outsourcing activities 0.87 0.85 
My company easily outsources different activities 0.90 0.88 
Top management has a positive attitude towards the outsourcing of activities 0.86 0.82 
 
IT strategic importance (alpha = 0.79) 
  
My company has an IT infrastructure that is strategically important for the 
company 
0.82 0.78 
Top management attaches a lot of value to the well-functioning of the IT 
infrastructure 
0.81 0.84 
Our business processes are highly dependent on a well-functioning IT department 0.87 0.89 
Top management finds it important that the IT department is involved in our 
firm's  strategic decision making 
0.82 0.81 
Without a well-functioning IT department we lose market share 0.76 0.60 
 
 
χ2 = 728, df = 466, p < .01, χ2/df = 1.56, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.93 
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Table 2. Results of the hierarchical regression analysis 
Variables Restricted 
model 
p-value Full model p-value 
Constant 0.476  0.11  
 
Control variables 
    
Log IT department size 0.14 p < .05 0.14 p < .05 
General outsourcing  0.14 p < .05 0.09 p < .10 
IT strategic importance 0.02 NS 0.04 NS 
Log Firm size 0.02 NS 0.03 NS 
Industry sector 0.11 p < .10 0.12 p < .05 
 
Direct effects 
    
Production efficiency 0.26 p < .01 0.26 p < .01 
Application technology 0.25 p < .01 0.26 p < .01 
Network technology 0.22 p < .01 0.20 p < .01 
Asset specificity 0.14 p < .05 0.16 p < .01 
Market uncertainty 0.13 p < .05 0.16 p < .01 
Technological uncertainty 0.10 p < .05 0.16 p < .01 
Switching costs 0.13 p < .05 0.18 p < .01 
 
Interactions (mean-centred) 
    
Production efficiency × Asset specificity   0.15 p < .01 
Production efficiency × Market uncertainty   0.17 p < .01 
Production efficiency × Technological uncertainty   0.14 p < .01 
Production efficiency × Switching costs 
 
  0.10 p < .05 
R2 0.54  0.59  
∆R2   0.05 p < .01 
N = 178     
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, * = significant at p < 0.05 
 Mean              S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
 
Application technology (1) 
 
4.41 
 
1.00            1.00 0.56* 0.63* 0.03
 
0.11 0.04 0.30* 0.02
 
0.17 0.03 0.16*
 
0.05 
Network technology (2) 3.66 1.13 0.56* 1.00 0.56*          
          
             
              
             
              
          
          
             
        
0.19* 0.03 0.02 0.22* 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.05
Production efficiency (3) 3.88 1.08 0.63* 0.56* 1.00 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.21* 0.06 0.17* 0.07 0.05 0.00
Switching costs (4) 5.03 1.08 0.03 0.19* 0.10 1.00 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.18* 0.12 0.38* 0.28* 0.20*
Asset specificity (5) 4.04 1.16 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.05 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.39* 0.08 0.20* 0.22* 0.12
Market uncertainty (6) 3.16 1.08 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 1.00 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.29* 0.05 0.12
Technological uncertainty (7) 4.21 1.18 0.30* 0.22* 0.21* 0.02 0.09 0.02 1.00 0.08 0.16* 0.14 0.12 0.07
Log IT department size (8) 0.38 2.96 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.18* 0.39* 0.10 0.08 1.00 0.03 0.32* 0.43* 0.07
General outsourcing (9) 3.94 1.30 0.17* 0.14 0.17* 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.16* 0.03 1.00 0.07 0.11 0.22*
IT strategic importance (10) 5.35 1.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.38* 0.20* 0.29* 0.14 0.32* 0.07 1.00 0.25* 0.23*
Log firm size (11) 3.10 1.27 0.16* 0.05 0.05 0.28* 0.22* 0.05 0.12 0.43* 0.11 0.25* 1.00 0.31* 
Industry (12) 0.42 0.49 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.20* 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.22* 0.23* 0.31* 1.00
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